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ST A TEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Contrary to Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction, this appeal is not from
an action of a municipal employee appeals board or from the district court's
review of an agency adjudicative proceeding. See Aplt.Br.1. Rather, Howick
appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake
City Corporation (" the City") on all of Howick' s claims. This Court has
jurisdiction over this matter .1

This case has a long history. In 2007 Howick filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals after the City terminated her as an at-will employee. In 2008
the Court of Appeals dismissed Howick's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Howick
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2008 UT App 216 (unpublished). Later in 2008 Howick
appealed from the decision of the City's Employee Appeals Board (" the Board")
that it did not have jurisdiction over her claim. While this second appeal was
pending, Howick filed an action in Third District Court for a declaratory
judgment and other claims based on her allegation that her employee status had
been unlawfully changed in 1998. R.1-14. Not knowing that she had already
filed her action in Third District Court, the Court of Appeals issued a decision in
2009, directing Howick to file a declaratory judgment action in the district court
to determine whether she was an at-will or a merit employee. Howick v. Salt Lake
CihJ Employee Appeals Bd., 2009 UT App 334, 222 P.3d 763 (" Howick II"). In 2011
Third District Court Judge Quinn ruled that Howick was a merit employee based
on his interpretation of the Merit Protection Statute. R.2234-39. The City
appealed, and in 2013 the Court of Appeals reversed the district court on the law
and remanded the case. Howick v. Salt Lake CihJ Corp., 2013 UT App 218,310 P.3d
1220 (" Howick III"). On August 4, 2015 Third District Court Judge McKelvie
ruled that Howick was in fact an at-will employee and dismissed her claims.
R.4040-47, 4073-74. On September 2, 2015, Howick appealed. R.4068-69.
1

1
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STATUTES AND ORDINANCES

No statutes or ordinances are determinative of Howick's appeal
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal centers on whether Howick was an at-will employee when the
City terminated her employment in 2007, after she knowingly and voluntarily
accepted an at-will "Appointed Senior City Attorney" position, signed a
document expressly recognizing her at-will employment, and received
consideration in the form of increased compensation for nine years.
Procedural History and Disposition Below

Complaint and Original Grant of SummanJ Judgment
In 2008 Howick filed her second appeal to the Court of Appeals. Howick II,
2009 UT App 334. On August 12, 2009, apparently recognizing she was in the
wrong court and before the Court of Appeals ruled, Howick filed a complaint
against the City in Third District Court. 2 Howick's complaint seeks a declaratory
judgment ruling that in 1998 the City unlawfully changed her merit employee
status to at-will in violation of the Merit Protection Statute (Utah Code §§10-31105 and -1106). 3 She also asserts claims for (1) wrongful termination in violation

2
3

R.1-14.
R.11-12.
2
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of statutes and public policy, (2) breach of implied contract, and (3) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 4 These claims rely on Howick's
-.J

contention that she was a merit employee under the Merit Protection Statute. 5
Not knowing that Howick had already filed an action in district court, the
Court of Appeals issued Howick II, directing her to file a declaratory judgment
action in district court regarding whether she was an at-will or merit employee.
2009 UT App 334,

,r,r1, 11.

The Court of Appeals explained the two possible

outcomes: "If the district court determines she was a merit employee, the [City's
Employee Appeals] Board is indeed the proper forum to determine whether her
termination was justified." If she was at-will, "the Board correctly ruled that it
lacked jurisdiction over the case." Id. if 8.
In the district court, the City moved for a ruling that Howick was an atwill employee. 6 The City argued that in 1998 Howick had contracted to become
..JJ

an at-will employee, had waived any statutory rights associated with merit
employment, and was estopped from disclaiming her at-will status.7 The City
also argued that Howick' s declaratory judgment action was time-barred because

R.7-10.
Id.
6 R.408-83.
7 R.462-80.

4
~

5

3
~
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it was not asserted until well after the statute of limitations had expired.8

Howick moved for a ruling that she was a merit employee under the Merit
Protection Statute. 9
Third District Court Judge Quinn denied the City's motion and granted
Howick's in part. 10 Although recognizing that Howick had accepted her at-will
position with the "explicit understanding that she was giving up certain rights,"
the district court concluded that the Merit Protection Statute trump[ed] all other
11

arguments." 11 The district court ruled that Howick could not have legally
relinquished her merit status, and therefore the City's defenses of contract,
waiver, and estoppel were immaterial. 12 The district court also rejected the City's
argument that Howick's declaratory judgment claim was time-barred even
though the court acknowledged that Howick could have asserted her claim in
1998. Judge Quinn explained that he did not think that the Court of Appeals

would want him to rule on that basis. 13 The City appealed.1 4

s R.452-59.
9 R.121-22.

The district court denied Howick' s request to be immediately restored to
her former position with all back pay and benefits. R.1216.
10

R.1215-16.
R.1208.
13 R.1214-15, 2236-37.
14 R.1221-23.
11

12
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Howick Ill's Reversal
In Howick III, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, as a legal matter,
,.;;

Howick could have relinquished merit protection by contract, waiver, or
estoppel. 2013 UT App 218, ,r,r1, 29-46. The Court of Appeals affirmed that
parties are free to contract away or waive statutory rights so long as doing so
does not offend public policy. Id. if 34. Relinquishing merit status did not violate
public policy, the Court of Appeals concluded, because the Merit Protection
Statute contained no provision prohibiting waiver-unlike numerous statutes
with anti-waiver provisions - and because Howick had not shown that
voluntarily relinquishing her merit rights violated public policy. Id. ,r,r3S-43.
The Court of Appeals rejected the City's statute of limitations argument, saying

..J

that Howick' s other claims "subsumed her claim for declaratory relief" and
therefore it was not time-barred. Id. if 18.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court to adjudicate
the City's three defenses of conh·act, waiver, and estoppel, and to "dispose of the
case as appropriate" if Howick was an at-will employee. Id. iiif 44-45.

5
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Howick filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that Howick III had
improperly relied on a 2012 amendment to the Merit Protection Statute.1 5 This
Court denied her petition. 16

SummanJ Judgment Ruling on Remand
After remand, the City and Howick filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. 17 The district court granted the City's motion and denied Howick' s. 18
The district court determined that under each of the City's three defenses of
contract, waiver, and estoppel, Howick had relinquished her merit rights and
become an at-will employee. Additionally, the district court dismissed Howick's
other claims of wrongful termination in violation of statues and public policy,
breach of implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, all of which were dependent on Howick's alleged merit status. 19

R.3914-39.
16 R.1332-35.
17 Because the parties simultaneously filed their motions, some of
Howick' s exhibits are out of order in the record. The City's motion, supporting
memorandum, and exhibits are found at R.1914-2284. Howick's summary
judgment materials are found at R.1388-1913 and R.2291-2681.
18 R.4040-48.
19 R.1967-72, 4046.
15

6
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Facts Relevant on Appeal

Howick's 1998 Appointment to an At-Will Position
The City hired Howick in 1992 to serve as counsel for the Salt Lake
Airport. 20 In 1997 and 1998, Howick expressed dissatisfaction with her salary. 21
The City had a compensation plan known as the 600 Series Plan. 22 The 600 Series
Plan had a range of pay grades, each of which had its own salary range. 23 At that
time, grade 613 was the highest grade available to the City's staff attorneys. 24
As a result of the salary complaints, then-City Attorney Roger Cutler
obtained approval for a new" Appointed Senior City Attorney" position at grade
614 of the 600 Series Plan ("614 Position"). 25 Cutler informed Howick in advance

that the new position would be at-will:

20
21
22

23
24

25

R.1926, 4040.
R.1926, 4040.
R.1928, 4044.
R.1844, 1871.
R.1926.
R.1927-28, 4040.
7
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Q: [Y]ou knew that the position, the 614 position that

you accepted, was, in fact, an at-will position?
A: I knew it had been stated to me that it was at-will. 26
Howick told Cutler she "did not want to go at-will," and she "believed
that he could not ask [her] to do that," but Cutler reiterated that the 614 Position
was at-will. 27 Cutler then gave Howick a document she described as "a waiver,"
which she refused to sign. 28 Cutler later gave Howick a revised document titled
"Salt Lake City Corporation At-Will Employment Disclaimer" ("Disclaimer"). It
stated:
I understand that, if I am appointed by the Salt Lake
City Attorney to the "Appointed Senior City Attorney"
position, my employment will be at-will and will be for no
fixed length of time.
I understand that no oral or written statements (in
personnel manuals, policies, procedures, or elsewhere) or any
conduct of the Mayor, City Attorney, or other City
official at any time, other than in a written contract of
employment signed by the Mayor or City Attorney, can
create an express or implied contract to the contrary. 29

R.1928-29, 3052, 3071.
27 R.3052, 3054.
28 R.3052, 3053.
29 R.1929, 4040-41 (emphases added).
26

8
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Howick chose to move to the 614 Position and signed the Disclaimer on July 22,
1998. 30 She did not object to the Disclaimer's language before signing it. 31

On August 4, 1998, Cutler provided Howick a copy of the 614 Position's
job description. 32 The job description stated the position was an "at-will
professional position, exempt from the career service system .... " 33 Howick
understood the phrase "career service system" to refer to "merit employment." 34

Howick's Increased Compensation
Howick had the option to remain a level 613 merit employee, 35 and she
had additional room for salary growth at that grade. 36 She was "not aware of
anything that would have prevented [her] from remaining at [the 613] level." 37
Three attorneys eligible for the 614 Position chose to remain merit employees at
the 613 level. 38 Howick accepted the at-will 614 Position. 39

R.3054.
31 R.1930, 3057-58.
32 R.1928.
30

33

Id.

R.3117.
R.1930.
36 R.2069 (showing 613 range of $4,312 to $6,814 per month), R.2099
(showing Howick' s monthly salary of $5,437 in 1997, before appointment to 614
34

35

Position).
R.1930.
38 R.1931.
37

39

Id.
9
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In accepting the 614 Position, Howick did not experience a change in job
duties or workload, but she did receive higher pay. 40 Roger Cutler reported to
the City's controller that Howick had been" appointed to a new classification of
614" and her salary increase reflected her "leaving the career service system." 41

Upon her appointment to the 614 Position, Howick's salary increased
11 %-$600 per month. 42 In contrast, the three attorneys who remained 613 merit

employees received monthly raises of $119 (1.9%), $171 (3.25%), and $181
(3.5%). 43 As the City's compensation manager explained, the 614 Position was

created to give senior attorneys like Howick "the opportunity to elect to go to
appointed [at-will] status" and receive "higher pay." 44 The at-will term was a
"significant factor" in the 614 Position's creation, and Cutler's office negotiated
with human resources to get the large pay increase based on "the fact that it was
an at-will position."45
In 2005, well after her appointment to the 614 Position, Howick explained
to a junior co-worker that attorneys go "at will" by "sign[ing] something

R.1932,
41 R.1931,
42 R.2095,
43 R.1932,
44 R.1928.
45 R.3879.
40

2025-26, 2721.
2095.
4041.
4041.

10
4836-0495-4949 v2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

acknowledging they have given up the[ir] merit status." 46 In contrast to at-will
employees, Howick explained, "[m]erit employees have a property interest in
.JJ

their job" and a right to "due process." 47
The Cih/s Compensation Plans

In 1998, the 614 Position was within the City's 600 Series Plan. 48 As the
City's compensation manager explained, the 600 Series Plan covered professional
employees, "most" - but not all-of whom were career service employees. 49 The
600 Series Plan nowhere stated it covered only merit or career service
employees. 50 To the contrary, the 600 Series Plan stated that 600 Series Plan
employees "in appointed positions ... are 'at will' employees" who are not
eligible for certain benefits available to merit employees. 51 The Mayor's office, the
~

head of human resources, the City's compensation manager, and the City
Attorney all approved the 614 Position. 52

R.1933.
47 Id.
48 R.2860, 2894.
49 R.2894.
50 R.1844-74, 2894-95.
51 R.1868 (Sections XIX(C)(7) and XXIII).
52 R.2904.
46
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In 2001, the City Council adopted a new "Unclassified Plan" specifically
for appointed, at-will positions. 53 Howick was a "Senior Advisor" (the highest
grade) under the Unclassified Plan, and her position was within the Unclassified
Plan at the time of her termination. 54

The Termination of Howick' s Employment
The City terminated Howick's employment in 2007. 55 Ed Rutan, the City
Attorney at the time, did not" go through the procedural steps applicable to
merit employees" when he terminated Howick's employment because he had
"relied on the fact that Ms. Howick was an at-will employee and had signed a
disclaimer agreement to that effect." 56 Howick received severance which was
only available to at-will employees.s7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Howick's appeal should be denied for three reasons: her declaratory
judgment action is time-barred, her attack on Howick III is without merit, and her
criticisms of the district court's decision do not dis tub the entry of summary
judgment.

53

R.1932-33.

54

Id.

R.4041.
56 R.1934.
s7 Id., R.3130, R.3146.
55
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First, Howick's declaratory judgment action (contending that she was
improperly made an at-will employee in 1998) is time-barred. She could have
,.;,

asserted the claim as early as July 1998 when she became an at-will employee. At
that time she knew she was no longer a merit employee with the job protections
of merit employment; in her words, she no longer had "a property interest in
II

[her] job" or a right to due process." She viewed the change as adverse to her,
II

objected to it, stated that she did not want to go at-will," and told the City
Attorney that she "believed that he could not ask [her] to do that." Under any
statute of limitations, Howick' s declaratory judgment action (filed 11 years after
she became at-will) is time-barred. 58
Second, Howick's primary argument on appeal is her attack on Howick III
(not the district court's decision). Howick claims that the Court of Appeals

Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals rejected the City's statute of
limitations argument in Howick III (discussed in detail below), the City may still
properly raise this argument. See Butler v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2014 UT 41, ,r 1, 337 P.3d 280 (noting that once final
judgment is entered, prior rulings that were steps towards final judgment
become appealable); Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc.,
931 P.2d 142,144 (Utah 1997) (after final judgment, any "intermediate orders"
may be appealed even if not specifically identified in notice of appeal). This
Court may affirm a judgment on any grounds apparent in the record," even if
such ground differs from that stated by the lower court. Jensen ex rel. Jensen v.
Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, if 36,250 P.3d 465.
58

II
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retroactively applied a 2012 amendment to the Merit Protective Statute "to
determine what the law was before the amendment was enacted." Aplt.Br.5.
Howick is incorrect. The Court of Appeals expressly stated it did not
retroactively apply the subsequent amendment to the statute. Rather, the Court
of Appeals held that Howick could lawfully have relinquished her merit rights
because the Merit Protection Statute did not prohibit a waiver of statutory
rights-in contrast to many other statutes-and because Howick failed to show
that her action in relinquishing her merit rights affected the public as a whole.
Third, Howick provides no valid reasons for reversing the district court's
grant of summary judgment. Howick ignores two of the three grounds for the
district court's ruling: the City's waiver and estoppel defenses. Although she
conflates these defenses with the City's contract defense, they are independent
and have different elements. Due to Howick' s inadequate briefing, the Court
may affirm the district court's waiver and estoppel rulings under the undisputed
facts.
This Court also should affirm the district court's conclusion that Howick
relinquished merit protection by contract. Howick disputes this determination.
Her arguments about lack of consideration, the City's 600 Series Plan, the City
Council's actions, and public contract law are misplaced.
14
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Finally, Howick contends that the district court erred in dismissing her
other three claims for relief. But Howick's arguments are procedurally
~

foreclosed, and summary judgment was correctly entered on those claims.
ARGUMENT

I.

HOWICK'S DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION IS TIMEBARRED.

Howick's declaratory judgment action seeks a ruling that the City could
not lawfully have created an at-will attorney position in 1998 or "coerced" her
into the position, 59 given Utah Code sections 10-3-1105 and -1106. This claim,
filed eleven years after the events giving rise to it, is time-barred under any
statute of limitations.60

II

s9 Howick' s coercion" argument is contradicted by the record given that
she admitted she could have remained a 613 merit employee, she signed the
Disclaimer to become at-will, and three other senior attorneys decided to remain
merit employees. But for the purpose of determining whether a controversy had
arisen between Howick and the City in 1998, the City may rely on her "coercion"
argument.
60 The statute of limitations is not merely a technical" rule that can be
ignored. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) (" [W]e
have emphasized the importance of the policies underlying state statutes of
limitations. Statute of limitations are not simply technicalities. On the contrary,
they have long been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial
system."); Hirtler v. Hirtler, 566 P.2d 1231, 1231 (Utah 1977) ("[S]tatutes of
limitations are not designed exclusively for the benefit of individuals but are also
for the public good. These statutes of repose are intended to prevent the revival
and enforcement of stale demands.").
II
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Howick' s Complaint confirms that the events in question occurred in 1998:
In 1998, the Attorney's Office created a new ...
Appointed Senior City Attorney [position] that. ..
purported to create an "at-will" status outside of the
state merit system ....
Plaintiff entered the newly-created Job Description
while objecting to the City's requirement that [she]
purport to relinquish merit status.
Defendant violated statutory restrictions by classifying
Plaintiff's position [as at-will] in violation of ... Utah
Code Ann.§§ 10 31105 and 1106 ... _61
All the events in question occurred in 1998. Howick II summarized the facts as
follows:
"In July of 1998 [Howick] accepted a new position and a
higher salary, in connection with which she signed a
document titled 'Salt Lake City Corporation At-Will
Employment Disclaimer.' The disclaimer stated that
[Howick] understood her position would 'be at-will and
will be for no fixed length of time."'

Howick II, 2009 UT App 334, iJ 2.
The Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, under which Howick brings her
claim, allows an action by any person "whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise" to
"request the district court to determine any question of construction or validity

61

R.2,3,7.
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arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain
a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations." Utah Code § 78B-6-408.
A declaratory judgment is intended to "remove ... uncertainty," and, with
respect to the validity of a contract in particular, the issue may be decided by the
district court even "before ... there has been a breach." Id. §§ 78B-6-402 & -409.
The "purpose of [a declaratory judgment] (i]s to provide a means of securing an
adjudication without the necessity of someone having to suffer damage or get
into serious difficulty before he could seek to have his rights determined in
court." Alternative Options & Servs. for Children v. Chapman, 2004 UT App 488,
,I16, 106 P.3d 744 (quoting Parker v. Rampton, 497 P.2d 848, 850-51 (Utah 1972)).

Four requirements must be satisfied for a plaintiff to proceed with a
declaratory judgment: (1) there must be a judiciable controversy; (2) the interests
of the parties must be adverse; (3) the plaintiff must have a legally protectable
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issues between the parties must be ripe for
judicial determination. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983).
A "judiciable controversy" exists when" either[] there is an actual
controversy," or" there is a substantial likelihood that one will develop so that

the adjudication will serve a useful purpose in resolving or avoiding controversy or
possible litigation." Chapman, 2004 UT App 488, ,I18 (emphasis added). Howick
17
4836-0495-4949 v2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

alleges that in 1998 the City imposed the at-will requirement on her despite her
"objecting," stating that she" did not want to go at-will," and telling the City
Attorney that she "believed that he could not ask [her] to do that." 62 As an atwill employee, Howick lost the "property interest in [her] job" and the right to
"due process" which she previously enjoyed as a merit employee.63 The
existence of a judiciable controversy did not require Howick to have been
terminated in 1998. There was an actual "clash of legal rights" because Howick
lost her merit" rights, status or other legal relations" allegedly over her
opposition. Chapman, 2004 UT App 488 at if 20 (" Appellants need not have
already suffered from a license suspension to be adversely affected" because a
declaratory judgment action is a means of securing adjudication "without the
necessity of someone having to suffer damage or get into serious difficulty"). In
sum, in 1998 there was a judiciable controversy between Howick and the City
when Howick suffered the alleged injury of losing her property interest and due
process rights in her job.
The second requirement for a declaratory judgment action also was
satisfied in 1998 because the "interests of the parties [were] adverse." Id. ,I 17.

62 R.3052, 3054.
63 R.1933.
18
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.

:,

"JI

II

As explained, Howick alleges she objected" to going at-will and signed the atII

will Disclaimer under alleged coercion," with Ms. Howick insisting she did not
.;;

want to be at-will and the City insisted it was a requirement of the new
position- although she later admitted she did not have to accept the new
position.
The third requirement that Howick "have a legally protectable interest in
the controversy" was satisfied in 1998. Chapman, 2004 UT App 488,

,r 23.

Howick had been a merit employee and claims that the City unlawfully took
away her merit status.
The final requirement that the issue be "ripe for judicial determination"
also was satisfied in 1998. All the facts Howick alleges in support of her
v)

declaratory judgment action occurred in 1998. There was an actual live
controversy, and there also was" a substantial likelihood" that a legal dispute
would develop so that the adjudication will serve a useful purpose in resolving or
II

avoiding controversy or possible litigation." Id.

,r 24 (emphasis added).

Had Howick

brought her declaratory judgment action in 1998, when the City allegedly made
Howick at-will in violation of statute, it would have resolved the issues of
whether the City had acted lawfully and whether Howick could relinquish her
merit rights in exchange for consideration.
19
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A statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the action (whether a
government action or a contract) that affects the interests of the party bringing
the claim. In Gillmor v. Summit County, for instance, this Court held that where a
government ordinance adversely affects a person's property interests, the statute
of limitations on any challenge to the ordinance begins to run "the moment the
ordinance is enacted." 2010 UT 69, ,I 31, 246 P.3d 102. See also Tolman v. Logan

City, 2007 UT App 260, ,I 10, 167 P.3d 489 (a challenge to validity of an ordinance
"became ripe upon the enactment of the ordinance and is now barred by the
statute of limitations").
Likewise, because entering into a contract immediately affects a party's
interests, a challenge to the contract's enforceability is subject to the limitations
period that runs from the date of the contract. This Court has held that a party to
a contract with a governmental entity cannot challenge the enforceability of the
contract after the statute of limitations has run:
Plaintiff's claim of duress is clearly barred by the
running of the statute of limitations. The claim is
basically that plaintiff entered into the contract [with
Salt Lake County] because [it was forced] to do so ....
Assuming, arguendo, that the [County's] threat did
constitute duress, nevertheless, plaintiff has sat idly by
for over ten years without challenging the
transaction .... [S] uch tardiness in asserting the claim
barred it under the statute of limitations.
20
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Q

Rice, Melby Enters. v. Salt Lake Cnh;., 646 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1982).
In the instant case, the alleged improper contract, the violation of Merit
,.;p

Protection Statute, and Howick's loss of merit protection occurred in 1998.
Howick could have brought her declaratory judgment action in 1998 as Judge
Quinn acknowledged:
[T]echnically either side could have brought a
declaratory judgment action testing the validity of Ms.
Howick's at-will status from the time it went into effect
[in 1998] .... Ms. Howick had the technical ability to
have previously brought a declaratory judgment action
64

See Johnson v. State, 945 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1997) (statute of limitations begins to
run from when plaintiff" could have first filed" a claim). Howick' s declaratory
relief claim is time-barred.65

R.2237. It appears that Judge Quinn did not apply the statute of
limitations because he believed that the Court of Appeals did not want him to do
so and stated: "I would not decide this case on statute of limitations grounds."
R. 2204.
65 Whether Howick' s claim is viewed as alleging fraud, mistake, or a
statutory violation (three-year limitation period under Utah Code§ 78B-2-305),
or as subject to the catch-all limitations period (four-years limitation period
under Utah Code§ 78B-2-307), or as challenging a written contract (six-year
limitation period under Utah Code§ 78B-2-309), her claim is time-barred because
she did not file her Complaint until eleven years after her cause of action
accrued.
64
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The Court of Appeals rejected the City's statute of limitations argument on
the ground that Howick's other claims "subsumed her claim for declaratory
relief" and therefore it was not time barred. Howick III, 2013 UT App 218, 118.
The Court of Appeals did not cite any Utah law and instead invoked a Ninth
Circuit case concerning a civil rights action brought by a prisoner. Id. (citing

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,566 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004)). Howick's other claims
are "wrongful discharge" claims based on her discharge in 2007 and are all
derivative claims relying on her contention that she was unlawfully made at-will
in 1998 in violation of Utah Code sections 10-3-1105 and -1106. 66

If the reasoning of Howick III were accepted, it would mean that Howick' s
declaratory relief action would be forever exempt from the running of the statute
of limitations so long as she asserts another claim that invokes her alleged merit
status in 1998. Howick could wait eleven years (or more) from when she became
an at-will employee and yet still contest the legality of the change of her
employee status. This approach would allow Howick to escape the application
of the statute of limitations to her declaratory relief claim merely because she
asserted derivative claims relying on the success of her declaratory relief claim.

R.2-10 (11 8,15,18,32-33,34,38,40-41,43-44,50,61 invoking Utah Code §103-1105 and -1106 plus ordinances and policies relating to merit employment).
66
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The Court of Appeals' reasoning also is contrary to Utah case law. Because
Howick' s wrongful discharge claims rely on her underlying claim that her merit
status was unlawfully changed in 1998, those claims are subject to the statute of
limitations applicable to Howick's underlying claim (not the reverse). See

Davidsen v. Salt Lake CihJ, 81 P.2d 374, 276-77 (Utah 1938) (explaining that, while a
quiet title claim generally is not subject to a statute of limitations, if the claim
"depends ... upon the cancellation of a deed for fraud or mistake," it must be
brought "within the period provided by law for an action based on that
ground"); Bangerter v. Petty, 2009 UT 67, ,I12, 225 P.3d 874 ("If the party's claim
for quiet title relief can be granted only if the party succeeds on another claim,
then the statute of limitations applicable to the other claim will also apply to the
quiet title claim.") (citation omitted). Howick's wrongful discharge claims do not
extend the limitations period governing her declaratory relief action, as the Court
of Appeals concluded; the opposite is the case. Howick's declaratory relief claim
is time-barred because Howick did not assert the claim until 2009, eleven years
after the events in question. Her assertion of additional, derivative claims does
not change that result.

23
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Consequently, this Court may properly conclude that Howick' s
declaratory relief claim is time-barred, and affirm judgment in the City's favor on
that basis.
II.

HOWICK III CORRECTLY HELD THAT HOWICK COULD
RELINQUISH MERIT STATUS BY CONTRACT, WAIVER, OR
ESTOPPEL.

On appeal, Howick primarily attacks the Court of Appeals' holding in

Howick III that, although Howick "was covered by the protections of the Merit
Protection Statute," she could nevertheless relinquish her merit protection
through contract, waiver, or estoppel. Howick III, 2013 UT App 218, iJiJ29-47.
The Court of Appeals correctly found that Howick failed to meet her burden to
show that an attorney's voluntary relinquishment of merit protection in
exchange for additional compensation violated public policy. Howick III is also
consistent with recent decisions from this Court.
A.

Howick Failed to Show, Free From Doubt, That an Attorney's
Choice to Relinquish Merit Protection In Exchange for Significant
Consideration Violated Public Policy.

Relying on Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 189 P.3d 51, and Lee v. Thorpe, 2006
UT 66, 147 P.3d 443, the Court of Appeals reiterated the principle that "[p]eople
are generally free to bind themselves pursuant to any contract," even one that
conflicts with statutory language, unless the contract offends "the public policy
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to which the statute gives voice." Howick III, 2013 UT App 218, ,I34 (quoting Lee

v. Thorpe, 2006 UT 66, ,I22). A contract in conflict with a statute is enforceable
~

unless the party challenging the contract makes a showing '" free from doubt that
the contract is against public policy."' Id. (quoting Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ,I21). Two
factors are relevant to that showing: (1) whether "the statute specifically
declare[s] contrary contracts to be void," and (2) whether the contract "harm[s]
the public as a whole, as opposed to the contracting party only." Id. (citing Ockey,
2008 UT 37, ,I23 (price fixing contract void where statute expressly made it
"prohibited," "unlawful," and "absolutely void," and "the contract harmed the
public as a whole-not just an individual")).
The Court quickly resolved the first factor in the City's favor. Nothing in

~

the Merit Protection Statute prohibited a municipal employee from waiving
merit status. Id. ir 35. This is in contrast to many other Utah statutes with express
anti-waiver provisions. Id. Howick's argument therefore failed under Ockey's
threshold question- a fact that Howick has not disputed in this appeal.
On the second Ockey factor- whether Howick' s contract harmed the public
as a whole or only her- the Court recognized that Howick had a heavy burden
of making this showing "free from doubt." Id. ,I,I34, 36. Howick did not meet her
burden. Howick failed to show that her contract affected anyone but herself. She
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was given a choice to waive her merit rights in return for higher compensation,
and she took it, in contrast to three other attorneys who chose to remain merit
employees. No one else's employment status was altered by what Howick did.
Her decision to sign the Disclaimer and accept the higher-paid, at-will 614
Position affected her alone, not" the public as a whole." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ,r 23.

Howick III is not a broad decision affecting municipal employees generally,
but one narrowly confined to the facts of Howick's individual decision as a
senior attorney to go at-will in exchange for substantial consideration. The Court
of Appeals earlier pointed out the unique facts of the case:
[Howick] is a sophisticated, seasoned attorney who
entered into a contract, and then for many years
accepted the benefits of the contract's at-will statuschiefly increased pay-and who now claims the
contract that afforded her those benefits is illegal.

Howick II, 2009 UT App 334, ,r 6 n.5. In Howick III, Judge Orme emphasized the
importance of Howick's status as an attorney to the public policy analysis:
The lead opinion correctly concludes that Howick has
not made 'a showing free from doubt that the contract
offends public policy.' .... Howick was not an
unsophisticated public employee but rather was a
seasoned, experienced attorney who can be presumed
to have known exactly what she was doing in entering
into the contract. Indeed, as a key attorney for the City,
she should have alerted her client, who also happened
to be her employer, to the possibility that the contract
was illegal if she honestly believed that it was .... [T]he
26
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public policy implications of [Howick's contract] would
be very different [if she were not an attorney].

Howick III, 2013 UT App 218, ,I47 (Orme, J., concurring). Howick III correctly
concluded that Howick had not satisfied "[]either Ockey factor," and therefore
that "the Merit Protection Statute did not prohibit Howick from contracting
away her merit protection." Id. if 43. 67
Apparently recognizing that she cannot satisfy either Ockey requirement,
viJ

Howick attempts to change the law, arguing that she should prevail because the
Merit Protection Statute" did not contain a provision allowing employees to
waive ... merit protections." Aplt.Br.19 (emphasis added). This is not the law.
As Ockey, Lee, and other decisions hold, a party may make a contract that is
inconsistent with a statute so long as the statute does not prohibit the contract
and the contract does not harm the public as a whole. See pp. 24-25 supra. See

also Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 2006 UT 71, ,Il6, 148 P.3d 945 (noting that Utah
Workers' Compensation Act embodies public policy prohibiting employer from
making agreement with employee to waive statutory rights because Act

Because Judge Quinn's decision was limited to his interpretation of the
statute and did not address the City's contract, waiver and estoppel arguments,
the Court remanded the case to the district court for "resolution of those issues."
Howick III, 2013 UT App 218, Id. if 44.
67
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expressly states "an agreement by an employee to waive the employee's rights to
compensation ... is not valid.").

Howick III was correctly decided and should be affirmed.
B.

Recent Decisions From This Court Support Howick III.

Decisions of this Court provide further support for Howick III. First, this
Court has emphasized that a party to a contract, even one who is the victim of
fraud, cannot enjoy the benefits of the contract and then try to undo it: "[It is a]
well-established principle that a defrauded party, after learning the truth will not
be permitted to go on deriving benefits from the transaction and later elect to
rescind." Dillon v. S. Mgt. Corp. Ret. Trust, 2014 UT 14, if32 n.20, 326 P.3d 656
(citation omitted).
Second, this Court has continued to apply the Ockey standard that for a
contract to be void on the basis of public policy, "there must be a showing free
from doubt that the contract is against public policy" and that it "harmed the
public as a whole." Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2013 UT 22, if 26, 301 P.3d
984; Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, if 21, - P.3d - .
Third, in interpreting a statute, a court must" give effect to omissions in
statutory language by presuming all omissions to be purposeful." Penunuri, 2013
UT 22, ,r1s. In particular, while some Utah statutes expressly make "certain
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contractual provisions unenforceable as against public policy," other statutes
contain "no such expression" and the court must

va

111

give effect' to this omission"

and not prohibit agreements without statutory basis. Id.

,r,rl 9, 27.

This Court's decisions confirm that Howick cannot repudiate the at-will
Disclaimer she signed after enjoying its benefits for nine years, that she has not
shown that her contract was contrary to public policy under Ockey, and that the
Merit Protection Statute did not prohibit her from entering into the contract.
III.

HOWICK'S ATTACKS ON HOWICK III ARE WITHOUT MERIT.

A.
..d)

Howick III did not retroactively apply the 2012 amendment.

Howick repeatedly asserts that Howick III retroactively applied the 2012
amendment to the Merit Protection Statute. Aplt.Br.2, 5, 15, 17. Her argument is

~

contrary to the decision's express holding that the 2012 amendment "may not be
applied to actions taken before its passage" and therefore is" inapplicable to this
case." Howick III, 2013 UT App 218, if if 41, 42.
If the Court of Appeals had retroactively applied the 2012 amendment as

Howick contends, Howick III would have been a short decision in favor of the
City, without any Ockey analysis and without remand. The 2012 amendment
"excludes from merit protection an employee who has either' acknowledged in
writing that the employee's employment status is appointed or at-will' or
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'voluntarily waived the protections required by Section 10-3-1106."' Id. if37
(quoting Utah Code§ 10-3-1105(2)(e) (2012)). Because Howick signed the at-will
Disclaimer and chose the at-will 614 Position, the court would have simply found
that Howick was at-will under the 2012 amended statute. It did not do so.
Howick attempts to make much of the fact that Howick III states that while
the 2012 amendment is "inapplicable to this case," it is not "irrelevant ... as a
reflection of current legislative views on public policy." Howick III, 2013 UT App
218, if 42 (quoting Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful CihJ, 803 P.2d 1241,
1246 n.2). There was nothing improper in the court's comment on the fact that
public policy may change over time. The Merit Protection Statute may originally
have been concerned about" spoils systems." It was then amended in 2004 to
make it easier for cities to terminate employees,68 and was amended again in
2012 to greatly expand the number of non-merit positions and at-will
employment generally. See Utah Code§ 10-3-1105(2)(3) (2012).

The 2004 amendment, according to its sponsor, was intended to
"provide stronger ability of a city to release or discipline some of [its]
employees" and to "giv[e] city councils and administrations the ability to fire
employees .... " House Floor Debate, 2004 Gen. Sess., (Statement of Rep. David
Ure), available at http:/ /www.le.state.ut.us/ asp/
audio/ index. asp ?Sess=2004GS& Da y=O& Bill =SB0023SO1 &House= H.
68
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G.;

Because Howick' s public policy claim is not rooted in the specific language
of the Merit Protection Statute or any other statute, a reviewing court may
~

properly consider multiple possible sources of public policy, including
subsequent statutes. This Court has explained:
The centerpiece of our inquiry is the strength and scope
of public policy. In our effort to assay this question, we
are not restricted to parsing statutory text and may
properly look to many sources, including legislative
history, which may illuminate the dimensions of the
public policy at issue. We are not troubled by relying on
legislative debate in 2004 to measure the clarity and strength
of public policy relating to weapons in the workplace in
September 2000 when the employees were terminated. The
legislature's 2004 debates on the interplay between
private property rights and the right to bear arms
reflects the latest stage of the uncompleted search for
equipoise between the right of persons to bear arms and
the right of persons, including employers, to regulate
private property.

Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, ,r1s n.7, 96 P.3d 950 (emphasis added).
In fixating on Howick III' s reference to the 2012 amendment, Howick
attempts to obscure the true weakness of her position: her failure to prove free
from doubt that her contract, even in 1998, violated public policy; it was not
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expressly prohibited by statute and it did not harm the public as a whole.69

Howick III was correctly decided.
B.

Howick' s "intervening controlling authority" does not conflict
with Howick III.

Howick characterizes three cases as intervening controlling authority that
should cause Howick III to be overturned: Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, 323 P.3d
998, Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64, 321 P.3d 1108, and State v. Perez, 2015 UT 13,
345 P.3d 1150. See Aplt. Br.17-19. The three cases explained that a court cannot
retroactively apply a substantive statutory amendment- as opposed to a
procedural one--on the basis that it is a "mere clarification" of the prior statute.

Gressman, 2013 UT 63, ,I17; Waddoups, 2013 UT 64, ,I9; Perez, 2015 UT 13, ,I9.
Howick III in no way conflicts with these decisions; it rejected retroactively
applying the 2012 amendment under the clarification exception. 2013 UT App
218,

,r,r39, 40-41. Howick concedes this, noting that Howick III" expressly stated

that the 2012 Amendment could not be applied to 'actions taken before its
passage,"' and "was 'not a mere clarification."' Aplt.Br.18.

69 Howick claims that by supposedly applying the 2012 amendment
retroactively, Howick III" impaired vested rights or altered prohibitions contained
in an existing statute." Aplt. Br.23. Howick had no "vested right" that was
"impaired" by the decision, and nor was there a statutory "prohibition" that was
11
altered" by the decision.
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C.

Howick Ill is not clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust.

Howick contends that Howick III is clearly erroneous and manifestly
unjust. Aplt. Br.20. That showing is a tall task-one Howick has not come close
to satisfying. This Court illustrated the demanding nature of the" clearly
erroneous" standard in Thurston v. Box Elder Chj., 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995),
when it refused to find an earlier decision clearly erroneous even though the
appellant's argument appeared to have some merit. 892 P.2d at 1039. The court
II

concluded that its prior analysis, while overstat[ing]" a legal issue, had not been
11

unreasonable" and the "interests of the parties and the court [were] best served

by adhering" to the law of the case. Id. For a decision to be clearly erroneous,
there should be no doubt under established precedent that the decision reached
the wrong result, and reversal must be in the interest of the parties and the court.
Howick has not met this standard.
D.

The authorities cited in Howick Ill are consistent with its holding.

Howick claims that Howick III is clearly erroneous because it relied on
cases that, as she views them, are not supportive of that decision. Aplt. Br.22-23.
Her characterization of these decisions is incorrect and is no basis to reverse
Howick III.
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In Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful CihJ, 803 P.2d 1241
(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the appellant's request for
damages for indirect, avoidable injuries was inconsistent with the "policy
expressed in the current eminent domain statute." Id. at 1246 n.2. Although the
current statute was" inapplicable," it still was" a reflection of current legislative
views on public policy" and supported the court's ruling that the appellant was
not entitled to its requested relief. Id. at 1246 n.2. Farmers thus supports

Howick III.
Howick also faults Howick III for relying on Ockey, 2008 UT 37. According
to Howick, Ockey holds that if a statute prohibits an act, the act is "illegal and
void." Aplt.Br.23. Ockey does not so hold, and Howick' s argument is flawed for
several reasons. First, Howick claims that the Merit Protection Statute prohibited
her relinquishing her merit status, but identifies no such prohibition in the
statute. Howick III pointed out that" the Merit Protection Statute contains no
express anti-waiver provision," unlike many other statutes. 2013 UT App 218,
~35. Howick does not controvert Howick III' s statement or show it to be
erroneous. Next, she ignores Howick Ill's reliance on Lee v. Thorpe, 2006 UT 66,
which recognized that" an enforceable contract can coexist with a statute that may

conflict with its terms so long as the contract does not offend the public policy to
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~

which the statute gives voice." Howick III, 2008 UT 37, if34 (emphasis added).
Howick' s assertion that a contract cannot conflict with a statute is contrary to Lee,
..;;

which noted that "not every statutory enactment rises to the level of public
policy." 2006 UT 66, if 24. Finally, Ockey also relied on Millard CounhJ School

District v. State Bank of Millard CounhJ, 14 P.2d 967, 971-72 (Utah 1932), a case in
which a bank exceeded its statutory authority and the court still held that the
bank's acts did not violate public policy. Howick III, 2008 UT 37, ,r22. Under

Millard County, Howick is incorrect in arguing that any act inconsistent with a
statute renders the act void.

Howick III was consistent with Ockey and other authorities discussing
public policy.

E.

Howick does not identify statutes, ordinances, or case law that
renders Howick III clearly erroneous.

Howick also contends that Howick III conflicts with certain statutes, City
ordinances, and case law. Utah Code Section 10-3-1221 (1998), cited by Howick,
Aplt.Br.24, states that municipal officers can prescribe rules and regulations "not
.~

inconsistent" with law. But as Howick III noted, the Merit Protection Statute did
not contain a provision prohibiting an employee from giving up merit status by
contract, waiver, or estoppel. The City did not unilaterally strip Howick of her
merit status without her consent, which might be inconsistent with the Merit
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Protection Statute. She was given the option of relinquishing merit protection
and pursuing a higher-paying, at-will position if she so desired.70
Howick also invokes Baird v. Cutler, 883 F. Supp. 591 (D. Utah 1995).
Aplt.Br.15n.6, 25. Contrary to Howick's apparent belief, Baird has no relevance to
this case and is not binding Utah precedent. While Baird addresses many
issues- a public employee's free speech rights, due process rights, retaliation,
and the ability of a City attorney to sue his client, id. at 597-6O7-it has nothing
to say about the Merit Protection Statute, public policy, or relinquishing merit
status by contract, waiver, and estoppel.
None of Howick's cited authorities is "at odds" with Howick III. Aplt.Br.25.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT HOWICK RELINQUISHED MERIT PROTECTION
THROUGH CONTRACT, WAIVER, AND ESTOPPEL.

The Court of Appeals instructed the district court to adjudicate the City's
defenses of contract, waiver, and estoppel. Howick III, 2013 UT 218, if if44-45. The
district court did so and ruled in the City's favor on all three defenses.
On appeal, Howick ignores the district court's waiver and estoppel
rulings. Her inadequate briefing as to these defenses provides ample basis for

70 This same analysis applies Howick's citation to Salt Lake City Code
§§ 2.53.030.A and 2.53.060.A.
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~

affirmance. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (noting that issue is
inadequately briefed when "the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to
-...,u

shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court").
As to the City's contract defense, Howick attacks the district court's
determinations that she received consideration for her at-will position, that the
Disclaimer made her an at-will employee, and that a City ordinance regarding
public contracts was inapplicable. Aplt.Br.27-34. The district court was correct on
all three points.
A.

Howick Fails to Challenge the District Court's Waiver and
Estoppel Rulings.

Howick' s appeal does not address the district court's rulings on the City's
defenses of waiver and estoppel. Instead, Howick conflates the City's contract
defense with its waiver and estoppel defenses, which she makes particularly
clear when she invokes a supposed "waiver contract." 71 She asserts that the
,.J

City's contract defense "is central to its three defenses," Aplt.Br.34, but provides

See Aplt.Br.26 (arguing that" a contract is a necessary under pinning [sic]
for all three of the City's defenses"), Aplt.Br.30 (contending that the City's three
defenses rely on the existence of a contract), Aplt.Br.34 (arguing that "[t]he City's
contract claim concerning the Disclaimer is central to its three defenses"); see also
R.2854 (arguing that Howick's argument about a "waiver contract" conflated two
independent defenses).
71
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no reasoning for that assertion. Contract, waiver, and estoppel are distinct
defenses with different elements.
The differences among the defenses are significant. While a contract is
created through offer, acceptance, and consideration, "[w]aiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it." 72 Waiver is not subject to Howick's
arguments that she received no consideration or that the City failed to follow
public contract law. See Aplt.Br.27-33. All the City had to show was that Howick
understood she had merit rights and that she intentionally relinquished those
rights by accepting the 614 Position. The City did so.
The district court also explained that estoppel requires:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2)
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken
on the basis of the first party's [conduct]; and (3) injury
to the second party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate [its] statement,
admission, act or failure to act. 73

n R.4045 (quoting Anderson v. Thompson, 2009 UT App 3, if 37, 175 P.3d

465).
R.4044 (quoting Whitaker v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 2008 UT App 282,
if 22, 191 P.3d 814).
73

38
4836-0495-4949 v2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Again, no consideration is required, and there are no public contract
requirements for estoppel. The City only had to show that Howick made a
~

statement, admission, act, or failure to act indicating she was an at-will
employee, that the City took reasonable action or inaction as a result, and that
allowing Howick to repudiate her at-will status would injure the City. Again, the
City did so.
In her opening appellate brief, Howick inadequately briefed any challenge
to the grant of summary judgment waiver and estoppel. See In re Estate of Cosby,
2003 UT 23, if 3,257 P.3d 509 (mem.) (declining to reach inadequately briefed
issues). Howick's reply brief does not cure her lack of adequate briefing.
Moreover, any additional arguments raised on reply would be improper and

.;J

should not be considered. State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) ("[T]he rule is well settled that the court will not consider issues

,_;

raised for the first time in a reply brief." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This Court may affirm the district court's summary judgment ruling on
waiver and estoppel without having to turn to Howick' s convoluted attacks on
the district court's contract ruling.
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Howick's Acceptance of the At-Will 614 Position Was Supported
by Consideration.

B.

The City pointed out that a contract may be oral, in writing, or a
combination of the two, and contract formation does not require formality or
express language, so long as the elements of a contract are met. 74 On appeal,
Howick does not dispute she was offered the 614 Position, that she accepted it,
and that she received an 11 % raise, in contrast to smaller raises received by
attorneys who did not take the 614 Position. She also testified that before
accepting the position, she "knew it had been stated to [her] that [the position]
was at-will." 75
Confirming her acceptance of an at-will position, Howick signed the
Disclaimer stating her new position "will be at-will." She did not object to the
terms of the Disclaimer when she signed it, nor did she object when she received
the job description stating that the position was at-will. 76 Under these undisputed

74

R.1950 (citing Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts,§ 3:2 at 259 (4th ed.

2007)).
R.1928-29, R.3052, R.3071.
76 Howick references a "1997 Job Description" stating the 614 Position was
"an appointed position in the Career Service System." Aplt.Br.10,11; R.2440-41.
Although she fails to do so on appeal, Howick correctly acknowledged in the
district court that this job description was "a draft." R.1409, if 21. Cutler asked a
subordinate "to take a swing" at the description, and Cutler "was disappointed"
that the subordinate "had just taken the old 613 [job description] and hadn't
75
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facts, the district court was correct in holding that the City had satisfied the
elements of offer, acceptance, and consideration. See In re Estate of Beesley, 883
·~

P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1994) (noting that consideration exists "whenever a
promisor receives a benefit or where [a] promisee suffers a detriment, however
slight" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Howick disagrees that she was compensated for the at-will aspect of the
614 Position. She argues that she signed the Disclaimer after she accepted the 614
Position and its 11 % raise, and, as a result, concludes that she could not have
been compensated for the at-will nature of her position. Aplt.Br.28. This
temporal argument is beside the point. Howick knew the position was at-will

before she accepted it and before she signed the Disclaimer. By signing of the
Disclaimer, she confirmed and memorialized her acceptance of the position's atwill feature. That the Disclaimer came after she knowingly accepted the offer of
vJ

an at-will position and its increased compensation does not change the fact that
the elements of a contract were met.
Howick also asserts that her 11 % raise had nothing to do with
relinquishing merit protection because the City's compensation manager did not

thought it through." R.2897. Cutler did not approve the 1997 draft to which
Howick cites. Id.
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complete a "salary survey" of at-will positions. Aplt.Br.28. Whether a salary
survey was done is irrelevant; Howick cannot pick and choose the aspects of the
614 Position for which she was compensated. The only changes in her job were
her at-will status and increased pay, as Howick admitted that her job duties did
not change. Indeed, as both the City Attorney and the compensation manager
testified, the higher pay of 614 Position was provided in exchange for the
attorney accepting at-will status. See p.10 supra.
The undisputed facts show that Howick's acceptance of the at-will position
was supported by consideration. Judge Quinn as well as Howick II and Ill
recognized that Howick received substantial consideration for going at-will.
Judge McKelvie did not err in reaching the same conclusion after a fresh look at
the undisputed facts.
C.

Howick Misinterprets the 600 Series Plan and the City Council's
Role.

To avoid the City's contract defense, Howick repeatedly argues that the
614 Position was placed in the Council-approved "merit" 600 Series Plan in 1998.
Aplt.Br.29. Based on this assertion, she argues she could not have been an at-will
employee. This argument crumbles on Howick's false premise.
The 600 Series Plan was not a "merit" plan. The City's compensation
manager stated that the plan included at-will positions-Howick even
42
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acknowledges one at-will position in the 600 Series Plan aside from the 614
Position. Aplt.Br.8. Howick has never identified a single sentence in the 600
-.:ii

Series Plan stating it applies only to merit employees. In contrast, the City
highlighted a provision in the 600 Series Plan stating that appointed positions
under the plan were "at will." 77 The district court was correct in concluding that
the 600 Series Plan" is not a determinative factor of whether a position is ... atwill or merit status." 78
Howick also asserts that the City Council" expressly rejected at-will
attorney employment." Aplt.Br.29. Not only is this assertion wrong, it is
unpreserved. Howick relies on an exhibit to the deposition of Victor Blanton, the
City's compensation manager, who testified that he was unfamiliar with the
exhibit, that it did not have the City Attorney's seal of approval, and that it "may
be a draft" document. 79 Howick cites no testimony or other evidence in the

~

record showing this draft plan was ever presented to the Council.

R.2859, R.4044.
78 R.4044.
79 R.3468-69.
77
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More problematic is that Howick argued the exact opposite to the district
court and did not cite to this draft version in any of her memoranda.so In an effort
to portray Cutler as acting outside the Council's authority, Howick argued that
the Council never discussed and never considered making attorney positions atwill.81 For instance, while Howick asserts on appeal that "someone (in all
likelihood Mr. Cutler) asked the Council to make the new 614 position 'at-will,'"
Aplt.Br.9, she argued below that "Mr. Cutler never asked the City Council to
create an at-will attorney position ...." 82 Her new assertion that the Council
considered and expressly rejected the at-will position is unsupported, contrary to
her argument below, unpreserved, and cannot be considered on appeal. See

Winward v. State, 2012 UT 85, ,r9, 293 P.3d 259; see also Tele-Commc'ns, Inc. v.
C.I.R., 104 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Propounding new arguments on

so The exhibit is included in the record because the City, in an effort to
avoid piecemeal attachments and citation to deposition transcripts and exhibits,
submitted to the district court all deposition transcripts and accompanying
exhibits.
s1 R.1411 ("The Council's minutes for its 1998 briefings concerning the
City's employment plans and budget show there were no discussions with the
Council concerning making any attorney positions 'at will' rather than merit
positions .... "); R.1412 ("The Council and Mayor thus formally adopted the ...
600 Series Plan ... without considering or including any at-will employment term
for attorneys .... " (emphasis added)); R.2749 (arguing that" the City did not
even ask the Council to" adopt an at-will position for attorneys).
s2 R.2712 (emphasis added).
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appeal in an attempt to prompt [a court] to reverse the trial court undermines
important judicial values.").
As the City explained at length below, and as the district court recognized
in its decision, the Council adopted general compensation plans as part of its
budgetary process. It was not tasked with approving specific job descriptions
other than for its own staff. 83 The Salt Lake City Code assigned the executive
branch the authority to establish positions and job descriptions within the
Council's plans and budgeted appropriations, and the 600 Series Plan allowed
thf .;,..-..·r.utive branch to create job descriptions and to appoint personnel to
positions. 84 Here, the 614 Position was approved by the Mayor's office, human
resources, the City Attorney, and the compensation manager as a position within
the 600 Series Plan, which included at-will employees. And the City Attorney's
salary expenditures in 1998 did not exceed the Council-approved budget. 85
Accordingly, Howick is wrong in asserting that the creation of the 614
Position was contrary to the Council's actions, Aplt.Br.30, or that somehow the
position existed for her to have accepted it and its compensation, but not its at-

R.4043.
84 Id. A thorough explanation of Howick' s misunderstanding of Council
involvement is found at R.2859-64.
85 R.2879, R.2975-81.
83
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will feature. Even assuming arguendo there was some bureaucratic mix-up in
1998, as Howick claims, in 2001 the Council approved a plan specific to at-will

employees, the Unclassified Plan. Howick' s position was in that plan from 2001
until the termination of her employment. She has never explained how her
theory of events in 1998 leads to the conclusion that she was not an at-will
employee for the subsequent nine years, most of which time her position was in
the Unclassified Plan for at-will employees.

D.

The District Court Correctly Held that Howick's Relinquishment
of Merit Status Did Not Have to Satisfy Public Contract Law.

Finally, Howick contends that she could not have become an at-will
employee under contract principles because any such contract is void for failure
to satisfy conditions of public contract law. 86 The district court correctly rejected
this argument.
Howick relies primarily on Salt Lake City Code section 3.25.010. That
ordinance protects the City against claims that the CihJ has entered into a contract
when it has not. The ordinance states that "[n]o liability against the city shall or
may be created ... which is not for a public purpose." Id. § 3.25.0l0(A) (emphasis
added). It then states that "[n]o contract may become valid or is binding against

The City's response to this argument in the district court is found at
R.2872-77.
86
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~

the city until" seven enumerated prerequisites are established. Id. § 3.25.010(B)
(emphasis added). This ordinance exists to protect the City from meritless
,,.j}

contract claims and to protect public funds. Indeed, it is found after ordinances
regarding procurement contracts, and before an ordinance explaining how
contractors can enter into contracts with the City. Id. § 3.24, § 3.25.030. As the
district court correctly concluded, "it is clear that [the ordinance] applies to
contracts in which liability is against the City" and not to an employment with a
City employee such as Howick.87
Howick also cites Utah Code section 10-6-138, which requires the City
Recorder to countersign contracts. But again, this statute provides a defense to
cities against claims of informal or implied contracts asserted by outside parties.

~

For instance, in Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974), the court rejected
the plaintiff's assertion that it had an "implied in fact contract" with the City. Id.
at 654. Because the supposed implied contract did not comply with the
countersignature requirement and other requirements, no liability based on the
supposed contract could "be created against the City." Id. (emphasis added).88

87 R.4043.
88 Even if the statute did apply, this Court has not required compliance
with the countersignature requirement in all cases against cities. See, e.g., Midwest
Realty v. City of W. Jordan, 541 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1975).
47
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Finally, Howick asserts that City Attorney Cutler acted without Council
authorization. Aplt.Br.33. As the City has shown above, and as it explained to the
district court, Howick' s arguments regarding the Council are meritless. No
Council authorization was required for the creation of the 614 Position, as it was
an executive function. When the City's compensation manager was asked
whether the Council would have to approve a job description for a position
within a compensation plan, he testified succinctly: "No." 89
Howick cannot use ordinances and statutes meant to protect the City
against contract claims by outside parties to avoid her own acceptance of an atwill employment position. The district court correctly rejected her arguments in
holding that she had contractually waived merit status.
In sum, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of Howick' s
declaratory judgment claim under its waiver, estoppel, and contract rulings.

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON HOWICK'S OTHER CLAIMS FOR RELIEF.

Howick takes issue with the district court's entry of summary judgment
on her three other claims for relief: wrongful termination in violation of statutes
and public policy, breach of implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant

89

R.3454.
48
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of good faith and fair dealing. As shown below, her at-will status and signing of
the Disclaimer are dispositive of those claims.

A.

Howick's At-Will Status and Signing of the Disclaimer Are
Dispositive of Her Claims for Wrongful Termination, Breach of
Implied Contract, and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing.

In its motion for summary judgment, the City explained that, if the district
court determined Howick was an at-will employee, this ruling and the
~

undisputed facts of the case would necessarily extinguish her other claims for
relief, as Howick pleaded them. 90
Howick's claim for wrongful termination in violation of statutes and
public policy identified two areas of" public policy" the City allegedly violated
when it terminated her employment: (1) public policies purportedly contained in
the Merit Protection Statute, Utah Code§§ 10-3-1105 and -1106, and (2) public
policies allegedly contained in Salt Lake City Code§§ 2.53.020 and .030. 91 The
City observed that if Howick was an at-will employee, she would be outside the
Merit Protection Statute. Similarly, the ordinances cited by Howick covered

~

"employment practices and decisions relating to ... [the] classified career and civil

90
91

R.1967-72.
See R.7-8.
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service systems" under the Merit Protection Statute. 92 Howick's 614 Position was
11

exempt from the career service system." 93 The City could not have violated

alleged public policies in statutes and ordinances concerning merit employees if
Howick was at-will.
Howick' s claim for breach of an implied contract experienced a similar fate
because the Disclaimer prohibited it. Howick alleged she had an implied contract
II

created by City ordinances, policies, procedures, resolutions and compensation
plans in furtherance of state municipal employment statutes," as well as
procedures enacted by the Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board. 94 But
Howick had signed a Disclaimer acknowledging that her employment was atwill and that
no oral or written statements (in personnel manuals,
policies, procedures, or elsewhere) or any conduct of the
Mayor, City Attorney, or other City official at any time,
other than in a written contract of employment signed
by the Mayor or City Attorney, can create an express or
implied contract to the contrary. 95
Signing this Disclaimer was more than sufficient under Utah law to
preclude Howick from claiming an implied contract with the City contrary to

Salt Lake City Code § 2.53.020 (emphasis added).
93 R.2074-75.
94 R.8.
95 R.1929 (emphasis added).

92
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what she signed. A clear statement of at-will employment like Howick's, as a
matter of law, "prevents employee manuals or other like material from being
considered as implied-in-fact contract terms." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818
P.2d 997, 1003 (Utah 1991); see also Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 2014 UT 55, ,I25, 345
P.3d 523, reh'g denied (Feb. 11, 2015).
Finally, Howick' s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing asserted that her implied contract created by" ordinances,
policies, procedures, resolutions and compensation plans" contained an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which the City breached. 96 But because
Howick had no implied contract, she could have no claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Tomlinson, 2014 UT 55, ,I32
.;J

("Because we conclude that [appellant] failed to establish the existence of an
implied contract, he cannot establish a violation of the covenant of good faith

.~

and fair dealing.").
This claim is also a derivative claim, based on the assumption that Howick
was a merit employee. The implied covenant claim expressly relies on the Merit

96

R.9-10.
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Protection Statute and cites to "Utah Code Ann.§ 10-3-1105(2)" as a basis for
claiming that the City "acted in bad faith." 97
In its summary judgment motion, the City argued that under Utah law,
courts will not inject terms into an at-will employment arrangement under the
guise of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the implied
covenant cannot" establish new rights or duties that are inconsistent with
express contractual terms." Young Living Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 2011 UT 64,
,r110 n.4, 266 P.3d 814. This Court also has held that where an employee's
execution of a disclaimer prohibited an implied contract- as is the case here- the
employee cannot "establish a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing." Tomlinson, 2014 UT 55, if 32.
Thus, the City established that if Howick was an at-will employee, it was
entitled to summary judgment on her other claims. In her opposition to the City's
motion in the district court, Howick dedicated just two pages of her 68-page
reply brief to her other claims and did not rebut the City's arguments or
authorities. 98

R.10 (if 61).
98 R.2761-62.
97
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B.

Howick Cannot Avoid Summary Judgment Under an Unpreserved
Theory and a Dilatory, Procedurally Deficient Request for
Discovery.

Rather than address the merits of the City's summary judgment motion,
Howick contends that (1) the district court erred in finding her claims to be
"moot," (2) she could have prevailed on her breach of implied covenant claim
under a theory she never pleaded or raised in the district court, and (3) further
discovery was necessary on her other claims, even though she failed to move for
such discovery under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Aplt. Br.
34-36.
1.

The district court's use of the term "moot" does not change
its grant of summary judgment on the merits.

Howick faults the district court for stating that her remaining claims were
"moot." Aplt.Br.34. In using this term, the district court was merely stating in
shorthand that Howick's at-will status was dispositive of her other claims. See
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "moot" as "[h]aving no practical
significance"). The district court dismissed Howick' s other claims on the merits
because she "was an at-will employee at the time of her termination." 99 This
Court can simply review the City's arguments below and affirm based on the

99

R.4047.
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legal theories and grounds apparent in the record, as well as the fact that Howick
has never legitimately challenged the merits of the City's arguments. See Bailey v.

Bayles, 2002 UT 58, if 13, 52 P.3d 1158.
2.

The Court should reject Howick's unpreserved theory of
recovery for breach of the implied covenant.

Howick next argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on her claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing because "it is very conceivable" she could show that she was fired
"because she sought to address serious concerns that she observed in the
workplace." Aplt. Br.34. This argument is unpreserved.
Howick' s Complaint never alleges that she reported workplace concerns
or that the City fired her for doing so. Nor did she raise this issue-either
through argument or affidavit-in opposing the City's motion for summary
judgment. Whether Howick reported "serious concerns" in the workplace was
within her personal knowledge. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2014). She had an
obligation to oppose the City's motion through affidavit with any evidence
within her personal knowledge, but she did not. Id. 56(e). If Howick felt her
complaint did not adequately express the bases for her claim, she had the
opportunity to seek leave to amend it, but she did not. See Harper v. Evans, 2008
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UT App 165, ,I14, 185 P.3d 573 (rejecting allegations not contained in complaint
where appellant failed to seek leave to amend).

3.

Howick failed to move under Rule 56(f) for further
discovery on her other claims.

Howick also contends the district court's ruling was premature because
'-'

her other claims were not subject to discovery and that the parties agreed to stay
discovery as to those claims in a scheduling order. These arguments fail for
several reasons.
First, Howick did not follow summary judgment procedure to prevail on
this argument. If Howick was aware of facts supporting her other claims for
relief- aside from her alleged merit status - she was required to oppose the
City's motion by submitting an affidavit setting forth those facts to raise genuine
and disputes. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a), (e) (2014). Alternatively, she was required
to move under Rule 56(£) and submit an affidavit explaining why she could not
adequately oppose the City's motion by affidavit and without further discovery.

Id. 56(f) (2014).100 Howick did neither.
Instead, she referenced the need for further discovery one time in her
opposition memorandum, stating that "[i]f the City prevailed on its current

100

The current rule is Rule 56( d).
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motion, additional issues would then require discovery and further action."101 In
attempting to articulate why her other claims were different, Howick continued
to rely on her asserted merit status-confirming that her other claims were
derivative of her declaratory judgment claim. 102 Because she did not submit an
affidavit to raise genuine issues of material fact or move for further discovery in
compliance with Rule 56(£), the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment on her other claims for relief on the merits. See Midland Funding, LLC v.

Pipkin, 2012 UT App 185, ,I4, 283 P.3d 541 (affirming summary judgment where
party failed to submit affidavit raising genuine issue of fact and failed to move
under Rule 56(£)); Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, ,I57, 70 P.3d 1
(" [T]he Grynbergs' request to reverse summary judgment to allow discovery was
not properly raised before the district court as a rule 56(£) motion, and we will
not address the issue as such.").

101 R.2760.
102 See R.2761 (arguing that the Unclassified Plan did not comply with the
Merit Protection Statute and that Howick held a position of merit
employment"); R.2762 (arguing that the City had committed to using merit
practices for positions covered by the Merit Protection Statute); id. (arguing that
the City breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
terminating her at-will and without cause").
II

II
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To mask these deficiencies, Howick refers to a scheduling order entered on
March 31, 2010. Under its terms, any stay regarding discovery and "proceedings"
v;J)

on Howick' s other claims lasted only until the district court ruled on her request
for declaratory judgment. 103 Any such stay expired when the district court first
ruled on her request for declaratory judgment prior to Howick III. Upon remand,
the district court held a scheduling conference, and its signed minutes from that
hearing did not limit the claims upon which the City could seek summary
judgment. 104 Under the rules, the City was allowed to move for summary
judgment "at any time." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(b) (2014).
But even assuming that the scheduling order somehow precluded the
City's motion for summary judgment on Howick's other claims, she did not

~

preserve that argument. Howick's memorandum opposing the City's motion did
not reference the March 31, 2010 scheduling order. At the hearing on the parties'

~

cross-motions, Howick vaguely referenced "an agreement" that discovery would
be done on" a limited basis," but she did not refer to the March 31, 2010
scheduling order or contend that it procedurally barred the City from moving for

103

l04

R.51.
R.1370-72.
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summary judgment on her other claims for relief .105 Her argument is
unpreserved. See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, if 51, 99 P.3d 801
(noting that issue must be "specifically raised" in a way that gives the district
court an opportunity to rule on it).
Finally, Howick contends that in one paragraph of a docketing statement
filed in 2011, the City" acknowledged that [her] first three causes of action were
not affected by the declaratory judgment action." Aplt.Br.35. This assertion is
inaccurate. In the docketing statement for Howick III, the City stated that "the
facts underlying this appeal" -related to Howick's declaratory judgment claim" are not sufficiently similar to the facts underlying the claims remaining before
the trial court to constitute res judicata on those claims." Aplt.Br.Add.3. The City
was correct because Howick' s other claims were not the same as her declaratory
judgment claim. See Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 2003 UT App 411,

,r1s, 82 P.3d 198 (noting that claim preclusion applies to a claim that was
previously litigated). It is not inconsistent to later explain to the district court
how Howick's other claims depended on her at-will status. Rather than rely on a
statement about res judicata in a 2011 docketing statement, Howick was required

105

R.4122 at 52:11-53:3.
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to "set forth specific facts showing that there [was] a genuine issue for trial" on
her other claims. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, if 18, 177 P.3d 600 (internal
..J!)

quotation marks omitted). She did not.
In light of Howick' s procedural deficiencies in opposing summary
judgment and her failure in this appeal to address the merits of the City's
argument on her other claims, this Court should affirm the entry of summary
judgment.
CONCLUSION

As a threshold matter, Howick's declaratory judgment claim is timebarred. Further, Howick III was correct in concluding that Howick could, as a
matter of law, relinquish her merit status by contract, waiver, and estoppel. The
district court correctly determined that Howick did, in fact, relinquish her merit
status by contract, waiver, and estoppel. This Court can affirm on all, or any one,
of those grounds for summary judgment.
Finally, the City was entitled to summary judgment on Howick' s other
claims for relief. Her arguments on appeal do not challenge the merits of the
City's arguments, but instead raise unpreserved, procedurally barred reasons to
further extend this nearly decade-old litigation.
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Consequently, the City requests that this Court affirm the district court's
judgment in all respects.
DATED this 31st day of March, 2017.
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